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Collective Bargaining Agreements in
Professional Sports: The Proper
Forum for Establishing Performance-
Enhancing Drug Testing Policies
David M. Wachutka'
I. INTRODUCTION
The effort to uphold the integrity of professional sports has brought the
issue of drug testing of professional athletes into the public spotlight. Many
professional sports leagues 2 have drug testing systems in place whose
policies are negotiated and agreed upon through the collective bargaining
process.3  Professional athletes, through their membership in players
associations, are unionized employees.4 The respective players association
negotiates on behalf of the players, with representatives of league
management or league owners, to establish the terms and conditions of the
players' employment. The process is called collective bargaining, and the
1. The author of this article is a law student at Pepperdine University School of Law and is a
2008 juris doctorate candidate. The author is an avid sports fan who participated in competitive
sports at the high school level and has continued to follow collegiate and professional sports
throughout his life. Before coming to law school, the author completed his undergraduate studies at
the University of Minnesota's Carlson School of Management in Minneapolis, Minnesota.
2. The professional sports leagues which are considered for the purposes of this article
include: Major League Baseball (MLB), the National Basketball Association (NBA), the National
Football League (NFL), and the National Hockey League (NHL).
3. See National Basketball Players Association, NBPA Collective Bargaining Agreement,
236, [hereinafter NBPA Collective Bargaining Agreement] http://www.nbpa.com/downloads/
CBA.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2007). See also National Football League, Policy on Anabolic
Steroids and Related Substances 2006, http://www.nflpa.com/pdfs/RulesAndRegs/Banned
Substances.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2007).
4. Lisa Pike Masteralexis, Drug Testing Provisions: An Examination of Disparities in Rules
and Collective Bargaining Agreement Provisions, 40 NEW ENG L. REV. 775, 776 (Spring 2006)
(stating that players in the National Basketball Association, the National Football League, the
National Hockey League, and Major League Baseball are all members of players associations).
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result is a collective bargaining agreement. In recent years, public
suspicions of athletes using performance-enhancing drugs have put pressure
on the professional sports leagues to tighten up their drug testing policies.6
Collective bargaining, which allows both sides to negotiate the terms of an
agreement, is the proper forum for implementing drug testing policies.
The intrusive nature of drug testing implicates the concern over a
person's right to privacy. Currently, Congress has proposed legislation
which would establish minimum drug testing requirements in professional
sports.7  This legislation is a reaction to suspicions and investigations
surrounding Major League Baseball players and the use of performance-
enhancing drugs.8  Federally mandated drug testing would raise
constitutional issues regarding the players' rights against mandatory drug
testing. 9 These concerns could be avoided if drug testing policies are
implemented through a collective bargaining agreement, negotiated and
agreed upon between the leagues and their players associations. 10 Thus, as
previously asserted, collective bargaining provides the ideal forum for
5. See E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 531 U.S. 57, 60 (2000)
(involving a dispute between parties to a collective bargaining agreement); Holmes v. NFL, 939 F.
Supp. 517, 520 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (involving a dispute as to the terms of the NFL collective
bargaining agreement); See, e.g., Major League Baseball Player's Association, 2003-2006 Basic
Agreement, http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba.english.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2007).
6. See Amy Shipley, Baseball Players Say Steroid Use is Heavy, WASH POST, May 29, 2002,
at DOI available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&
contentld=A24530-2002May28 (last visited Nov. 23, 2007); see also Erik Brady, Dick Patrick, and
Andrea Stone, Politicians Weighing in Heavily on Steroid Testing, USATODAY.COM, June 22, 2005,
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/2005-06-22-steroid-testing-congress-x.htm (last visited Nov. 23,
2007).
7. Charles V. Dale, CRS Report for Congress, Federally Mandated Random Drug Testing in
Professional Athletics: Constitutional Issues, CRS-1, June 27, 2005, available at
http://www.opencrs.com/rpts/RL3291 l_20050627.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2007). The
McCain/Davis proposal would require professional sports leagues to implement independently
administered drug-testing programs mirroring the standards of the United States Anti-Doping
Agency (USADA). Id. "At a minimum, each professional athlete would have to be tested no less
than five times each calendar year, including at least two off-season tests." Id. Athletes who test
positive for any of the USADA prohibited substances, or refuse to take a test would face a minimum
two year suspension and a lifetime ban for a second failed test. Id.
8. See Brady et. al., supra note 6 (stating that Congress issued the message to Major League
Baseball to clean up their act on steroid testing).
9. Dale, supra note 7, at CRS-2. Federal courts have recognized limits on congressionally
mandated drug testing requirements based largely on issues of constitutional privacy. Id. "Drug
testing programs have also been challenged under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments,
based on arguments that the testing procedures or some other aspect of the program violated rights to
due process, equal protection, privacy, and freedom of religion." Id. at CRS-2 n.2.
10. See Masteralexis, supra note 4, at 776 (stating that when the policies are established
through collective bargaining the parties are able to negotiate the deal and essentially give their
consent to the policy which is adopted).
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implementing performance-enhancing drug testing policies in professional
sports.
Part II of this article explores the evolution and nature of professional
sports in America and analyzes why the public is demanding that
professional athletes be submitted to performance-enhancing drug testing."
Part III of the article scrutinizes the nature of drug testing, examines the
associated constitutional concerns, and recognizes current drug testing
policies in professional sports. 2 Part IV of the article provides an overview
of collective bargaining agreements and the use of arbitration.' 3 Then, Part
V explains why collective bargaining is the appropriate forum for
implementing performance-enhancing drug testing policies in professional
sports.' 4 Finally, this article concludes by acknowledging the advantages of
using collective bargaining instead of federal legislation to establish drug
testing policies. 5
II. NATURE OF THE GAME
Professional sports provide entertainment for millions of people around
the world. The human attraction to athletic competition has been apparent
throughout the existence of man. Sport has been a centerpiece in the culture
of the people since the establishment of the Coliseum in ancient Rome.
Today, people still flock to stadiums around the world to view various sports
competitions.16 The appeal of a professional sports league is largely based
on having the best players in the world competing at the highest level.
However, if the integrity of the players or the competition is questioned, the
league becomes less appealing to spectators. If players appear to be using
steroids to become bigger, stronger, or faster than they otherwise would be,
11. See infra pp. 3-5.
12. See infra pp. 5-15.
13. See infra pp. 15-24.
14. See infra pp. 24-26.
15. See infra pp. 26-27.
16. See Press Release, Major League Baseball, Major League Baseball's Record Attendance
Tops 76 Million (Oct. 2, 2006) available at http://mlb.mlb.com/news/pressreleases/
pressjrelease.jsp?ymd=20061002&contentid=1695261&vkey = pr._mlb&fext=.jsp&c_id=mlb (last
visited Nov. 23, 2007) (over 76 million fans attended a major league baseball game in 2006.); see
also ESPNsoccemet.com, Premiership Attendance 2005/06, http://soccemet.espn.go.com/stats
/attendance?league=eng. 1 &year=2005&cc=5901 (last visited Nov. 23, 2007) (Twelve million people
attended premiership soccer matches in England during the 2005-2006 season.).
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the display of natural talent and ability is lost. This concern calls for drug
testing of professional athletes.
Modem professional sports leagues have a wealth of history, but none
more than baseball. Known as the national pastime of America, baseball has
been popular in America since the beginning of the twentieth century.' 7 A
baseball player hitting a home run is one of the most impressive acts in all of
sport, and one of the greatest shows of strength. Major League Baseball's
records for the most home runs hit in a single season, and for the most home
runs hit in a career, are arguably the most cherished records in sports. In
1961, Roger Maris set the single season record when he hit sixty-one home
runs.' 8 No player defeated that record for thirty-seven years.' 9  In 1998,
both Sammy Sosa and Mark McGwire made history as they hit sixty-six and
seventy home runs, respectively.2° Since 1998, the mark set by Maris has
been surpassed four more times, with Barry Bonds holding the current
record for the seventy-three home runs he hit in 2001.2 The breaking of this
historic record brought the issue of performance-enhancing drugs into the
public spotlight. Baseball fans rejected the idea of unnatural players
breaking historic records and tarnishing the integrity of America's pastime.2
During the 2007 season, Bonds again put his name in the record books, this
time by breaking the record for most career home runs, previously held by
Hank Aaron.23 More controversy surrounds Bonds and Major League
Baseball amid the speculation of Bonds' steroids use and his imprint in the
baseball record books. 24  Consequently, performance-enhancing drugs
present a problem in Major League Baseball, where several players have
admitted to using, and the integrity of the game is being questioned by the
17. See, e.g., Baseball Almanac, http://www.baseball-almanac.comL/yearmenu.shtml (last
visited Nov. 23, 2007) (contains records since 1901 in the American League and since 1876 in the
National League).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. After breaking Maris' mark in 1998, McGwire and Sosa hit sixty-three and sixty-five
home runs, respectively, in 1999. Id. In 2001, Bonds hit seventy-three home runs and Sosa hit
sixty-four. Id.
22. See Shipley, supra note 6 (stating that players acknowledge that steroids have led to
tainted records).
23. See Tim Brown, Bonds is the All-time Home Run King, Yahoo! Sports, Aug. 8, 2007
http://sports.yahoo.com/mlb/news;_ylt=AoK8mQTOB6FftMB7GibPseM5nYcB?slug=ti-
bondsdoesit08O8O7&prov=yhoo&type=lgns (last visited Nov. 23, 2007).
24. See Dan Wetsel, Hollow, not Hallowed, Yahoo! Sports, Aug. 7, 2007, http://sports.
yahoo.com/mlb/news;_ylt=AihJhMmAn3CY4p0yS I ehh.A8R9MF?slug-dw-756bonds080707&prov
=yhoo&type=lgns (last visited Nov. 23, 2007) (Speculation continues regarding the records being set
in Major League Baseball during the "steroid era.").
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public. 25  The sharp increase of home runs in the late 1990's and into the
twenty-first century has raised the suspicions of many and prompted the
grand jury investigations and proposed legislation currently pending in
Congress.26
III. DRUG TESTING
Drug abuse is one of the most serious and tragic social problems
affecting the American people.2 7  Not only are Americans abusing illicit
drugs, such as marijuana, cocaine, and heroin, but they are also increasingly
misusing prescription drugs.28 Drug abuse takes its toll on the American
medical system, the court system, and the personal lives of drug abusers and
their families. 29 Drug abuse also contributes to higher costs for employers in
a number of different ways. 30 Not surprisingly, many employers are testing
their employees for drug use. 31  Drug testing programs are instituted in
various ways and can include any or all of the following: pre-employment
testing, random testing, reasonable suspicion/cause testing, post-accident
25. See Shipley, supra note 6 (Major League Baseball commissioner, Bud Selig,
acknowledges that steroids present a problem that must be dealt with.).
26. See Dale, supra note 7 ("Problems of usage of steroids and other performance enhancing
drugs in professional and amateur athletics have been the focus of a series of investigative hearings
before the House Government Reform Committee.").
27. National Institute on Drug Abuse, Drug Abuse and Addiction: One of America's Most
Challenging Public Health Problems, http://www.drugabuse.gov/about/welcome/aboutdrugabuse/
magnitude (last visited Nov. 23, 2007) (Substance abuse contributes to drugged driving, violence,
stress, and child abuse.).
28. National Institute on Drug Abuse: Research Report Series, Prescription Drugs: Abuse and
Addiction, http://www.drugabuse.gov/PDF/RRPrescription.pdf (last visited on Nov. 23, 2007). "The
nonmedical [sic] use or abuse of prescription drugs is a serious and growing public health problem."
Id. An estimated forty-eight million people (approximately 20% of the United States population)
have used prescription drugs for non-medical use.) Id.
29. See National Institute on Drug Abuse, supra note 27 (stating that substance abuse costs our
nation more than $484 billion per year in health care expenditures, lost earnings, and costs
associated with crime and accidents).
30. Mark A. Rothstein, Drug Testing in the Workplace: The Challenge to Employment
Relations and Employment Law, 63 C-I.-KENT. L. REv. 683, 688 (1987) ("The costs of employee
drug abuse borne by employers can be divided into six categories: (1) lost productivity; (2) accidents
and injuries; (3) insurance; (4) theft and other crimes; (5) employee relations; and (6) legal
liability.").
31. See Rothstein, supra note 30, at 703 (stating that drug testing in the private sector has
become widespread).
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testing, return to duty testing, and follow-up testing.32  Drug testing
programs for federal employees are mandatory and have been for the past
twenty years.33  Drug testing in the private sector has also become
increasingly prevalent, although not mandated by federal law. 4
A. Constitutional Aspects of Drug Testing
The legality of employee drug testing has raised challenges on a number
of constitutional grounds.35  Much of the controversy and concern
surrounding drug testing is due to the intrusiveness required to properly
test.36 Privacy concerns are immediately raised when someone is forced to
supply a sample from his or her body to test for drugs. The most common
32. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration: Division of Workplace
Programs, Reasons for Drug Testing, Feb. 2005, http://workplace.samhsa.gov/DrugTesting/
Files-Drug-Testing/Federal/Reasons%20for/2ODrug%20Testing%20-%2OFebruary%202005.pdf
(click "drug testing," then click "Reasons for Drug Testing [pdfJ") (last visited Nov. 23, 2007).
"Pre-employment testing requires an individual to provide a specimen during the job application
process." Id. "Generally, a negative drug result is required before employment is offered to the
individual." Id. Random drug testing involves an employer selecting one or more individuals
included in the drug testing program to be tested using a "truly random selection process". Id. An
employer using a random selection process is "precluded from pre-selecting a particular individual
to be tested." Id. Under a reasonable suspicion testing program, "an employee is tested when there
is sufficient evidence to indicate that the employee may have used an illicit substance." Id.
"[E]vidence is typically based on direct observations by supervisors or co-workers that an 'employee
has used or possess an illicit substance, exhibits physical symptoms of being under the influence,
and has patterns of abnormal or erratic behavior."' Id. Post-accident testing is done "when an
employee has been involved in an accident or incident on the job." Id. Results of post-accident
testing "may provide evidence as to the cause of the accident or incident." Id. Return to duty testing
requires an employee to "provide a specimen to ensure that the employee is drug-free before being
allowed to return to work." Id. Follow-up testing is done to ensure an employee remains drug-free
after returning to work. Id.
33. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration: Division of Workplace
Programs, Model Plan for a Comprehensive Drug Free Workplace, http://dwp.samhsa.gov/
FedPgms/Pages/ModelPlan/Intro.aspx (then click "Federal Programs," then click "HHS Mandatory
Guidelines") (last visited Nov. 23, 2007).
34. See Rothstein, supra note 30, at 703 n.122 ("Ironically, government testing programs have
been justified because of testing in the private sector. Then, governmental testing programs and
advocacy of testing have been cited as the basis for increased testing in the private sector.").
35. See Rothstein, supra note 30, at 704. Fourth Amendment concerns regarding unreasonable
search and seizure are the most common bases for constitutional challenge to employee drug testing.
Id. Arguments that testing procedures violate due process concerns of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments have also been raised. Dale, supra note 7, at CRS-2 n.2.
36. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989) (stating that
"the collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long
recognized as reasonable," and that "these intrusions must be deemed searches under the Fourth
Amendment").
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source of a sample is urine, although blood, saliva, hair, and other specimens
are also used. 7
1. Fourth Amendment Concerns
The most frequently raised challenge to the constitutionality of drug
testing is that it is an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. 38  The Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution guarantees an individual's right to be free from unreasonable
searches. 39 In Schmerber v. California, the Supreme Court held that taking a
blood sample from a criminal defendant was a search within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. 40  Likewise, taking a bodily sample from an
employee for drug testing is deemed a search.
An individual can waive his or her Fourth Amendment protection from
unreasonable searches when he or she voluntarily consents to a search.42
The issue becomes less clear, however, with third-party consent to a drug
test. This is the case when a union negotiates with an employer the terms of
a collective bargaining agreement which provides for drug testing of the
employees. There have been several cases where the Court has upheld third-
37. Rothstein, supra note 30, at 691 ("[B]lood, breath, saliva, hair and other specimens have
been used in settings other than the workplace. Blood testing by employers is mostly limited to
retrospective testing after the occurrence of an accident.").
38. Rothstein, supra note 30, at 704. See also Skinner, 489 U.S. at 660; Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (questioning whether a blood sample drawn from a criminal
defendant despite his refusal was an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth
Amendment).
39. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Id.
40. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767 (stating that taking a blood sample to determine if the
defendant is intoxicated plainly operates as a search under the Fourth Amendment).
41. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617 ("Because it is clear that the collection and testing of urine
intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable, the Federal
Courts of Appeals have concluded unanimously, and we agree, that these intrusions must be deemed
searches under the Fourth Amendment.").
42. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) ("[O]ne of the specifically
established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is
conducted pursuant to consent.").
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party consent to the search of another individual.43 However, none of these
cases have involved drug testing, which raises increased privacy concerns as
a search of the body itself, and it is not clear that this scenario was imagined
by the courts in these prior third-party consent to search cases.
2. Government Interest vs. Individual Rights
The Fourth Amendment, however, only bars "unreasonable searches."
44
In general, the Court has considered a search without a warrant or consent to
be unreasonable. 45  However, there is a recognized exception to this rule
where the importance of the government interest in conducting the search
outweighs the intrusion upon the individual's rights.46
The manner in which drug testing must be done is a great intrusion on
personal privacy, so the government interest in performing the drug test
would have to be significant.47 However, this issue would not apply to a
drug testing policy implemented through the collective bargaining process.
In that scenario, we are not concerned with government action, and the
employees are considered to have consented to the search.48 On the other
hand, federally mandated drug testing constitutes government action, which
is subject to Due Process concerns under the Fifth and Fourteenth
43. See, e.g., Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964) (recognizing ability of agent to
consent on behalf of principal); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974) ("The consent of
one who possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, non-
consenting person with whom that authority is shared."); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969)
(holding that cousin who shared duffel bag with defendant could consent to a search of the bag).
44. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
45. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720 (1987) (["E]xcept in certain carefully defined
classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless
authorized by a valid search warrant." (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29
(1967)).
46. See O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 719-20 ("A determination of [an appropriate] standard of
reasonableness applicable to a particular class of searches requires 'balanc[ing] the nature and
quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the
governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion."' (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S.
696, 703 (1983)).
47. Charles Neil Floyd, Searches in the Absence of Individualized Suspicion: The Case of
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 50 ARK. L. REv. 335, 340 (1997) ("The [Acton] Court
balanced the compelling need for the search against the intrusiveness of the search." (citing Acton v.
Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J, 496 F. Supp. 1354, 1364-65 (D. Or. 1992))).
48. See Masteralexis, supra note 4, at 776 (stating that when policies are established through
collective bargaining the parties are able to negotiate the deal and essentially give their consent to
the policy which is adopted).
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Amendments. 49 To determine what level of judicial review should be given
to federal laws that mandate drug testing, we first need to determine whether
such a drug testing policy would threaten the individual's fundamental right
of privacy. 0
If the courts decided a federal drug testing program did not implicate an
individual's fundamental right of privacy, a relatively lenient standard of
judicial review would be applied to the legislation, and the court would
merely look for a rational basis behind the law. 5 However, if the courts
determined that the fundamental right to privacy was abridged, then the level
of review would be much stricter, and the court would have to find a
compelling state interest behind the law, which could not be achieved using
less drastic measures.5 2 In order for federally mandated drug testing to be
considered unconstitutional, the reviewing court must find that there is not a
sufficient government interest to justify intrusion into the individual's
rights." Ultimately, if the court finds that the fundamental right to privacy
is at issue, the legislation is likely to be found unconstitutional. 4
3. Government Interest in Drug Testing for Professional Athletes
If a court determines that there is a sufficient compelling state interest in
drug testing professional athletes that outweighs intrusion on privacy, the
49. The Fifth Amendment states in part: "No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law..." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment
makes this same principle applicable to the States. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
50. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1968) (stating the need to elevate the
right of privacy due to the penumbra relationship with other provisions in the Constitution (Fourth
Amendment) and the relationship between past precedents of the Court and the right to privacy).
51. Laws limiting substantive rights are given permissive review by the courts. See Carolene
Products Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18, 31-32 (stating that congressional laws or regulations will
normally be beyond attack without a "showing that there is no rational basis for the legislation").
52. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 504 (White, J., concurring) (identifying that statutes regulating
the fundamental right of privacy must be given strict scrutiny and "viewed in the light of less drastic
means for achieving the same basic purpose" (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488
(1960))).
53. See id. (stating the elevated right of privacy and the need for a compelling state interest in
order to encroach upon that right).
54. See id. Where the Court applies the compelling state interest test - such as in cases
involving the fundamental right of privacy - the Court will find the legislation unconstitutional if
there is any less drastic means of advancing the particular state interest. See id. This "strict
scrutiny" level of review is much more likely to find the law is unconstitutional. See id.
9
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legislation may be upheld.15  In Shoemaker v. Handel,5 6 the Third Circuit
upheld state-mandated drug and alcohol tests administered to thoroughbred
racehorse jockeys as constitutional. 7 The Shoemaker court found that the
integrity of the sport outweighed the jockeys' individual reduced privacy
interests.58 The state of New Jersey had a strong interest regarding the
public perception of the horseracing industry because "public confidence
forms the foundation for the success of an industry based on wagering." 9
The drug testing policy provided an "effective means" of upholding the
public perception that the racing was free of "outside influences. 6 °  The
Shoemaker court recognized that horseracing is a closely regulated state-run
industry.61 In contrast, professional sports leagues such as Major League
Baseball, the National Football League, and the National Basketball
Association are private entities, not under control of the state, and would not
be subject to the reasoning in Shoemaker supporting state mandated drug
62testing.
4. Athletes' Diminished Expectation of Privacy
In Vernonia School District v. Acton,63 the Supreme Court upheld a
random drug-testing program for high school students engaged in
interscholastic athletic competition. 64 The Veronia School District Court
found that high school students' privacy interest was diminished by the
55. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 504 (White, J., concurring) ("Where there is a significant
encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating
interest which is compelling." (quoting Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960))).
56. Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986).
57. Id. The Third Circuit emphasized the pervasiveness of New Jersey state regulation and the
state's "strong" interest in preserving the "integrity" of the horseracing industry. Id. (quoting Dale,
supra note 7, at CRS-4).
58. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1142 ("[W]hen jockeys chose to become involved in this
pervasively-regulated business and accepted a state license, they did so with the knowledge that the
Commission would exercise its authority to assure public confidence in the integrity of the
industry.").
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1142-43.
61. Id. at 1141-42 (noting that the case involved voluntary participants in a highly-regulated
industry and the same analysis would not apply to drug-testing in other contexts).
62. See id. at 1142 (reasoning that the justifiable expectation of privacy for the jockeys was
diminished because of the pervasive state regulation of the industry).
63. Veronia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
64. Id. at 666. The Student Athlete Drug Policy required mandatory and random suspicionless
urinalysis of all student athletes within the district. Id. (quoting Dale, supra note 7, at CRS-4). All
students wanting to participate in a school-sponsored sports team had to provide a consent form,
signed both by the student and his or her parents, acquiescing in the tests. Id.
10
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communal aspect of high school athletic competition. 6  Significantly, the
Court emphasized that the expectation of privacy within the school
environment is less than that for the public generally. 66
Vernonia School District involved drug testing of high-school athletes
with a diminished expectation of privacy, and is distinguishable from a
scenario involving federally-mandated drug testing in professional sports.67
Professional athletes do not share this diminished expectation of privacy, at
least, not for the same reasons.68
One could argue that professional athletes do have a diminished
expectation of privacy because league or association rules already require
routine physical examinations. 69  Additionally, one could argue that the
"safety and health concerns" of the athletes, the "importance of professional
athletes as role models," or the protection of the integrity of the game itself
are all compelling interests that justify drug testing of the players.7 °
Although the law regarding drug testing is somewhat unclear, there are
two scenarios where federally mandated drug testing is constitutional: (1)
Where a compelling state interest in conducting the drug test overrides
privacy concerns; (2) where the individual consents to the drug test.7 ' The
analysis required to balance state interests and privacy concerns would not
be required in the realm of professional sports if the drug testing policies
were allowed to continue to be implemented through collective bargaining.7
65. Vemonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 657. Every person in the general population is entitled to
a legitimate expectation of privacy. These privacy expectations are less for student athletes. Id. The
environment of high school athletics has an "element of communal undress [that] is inherent." Id.
66. Dale, supra note 7, at CRS-5 ("The [Veronia Sch. Dist. Court] emphasized that 'students
within the school environment have a lesser expectation of privacy then members of the public
generally."' (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 657))).
67. Veronia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 648.
68. See id. at 654 (noting that "unemancipated minors lack some of the most fundamental
rights of self-determination...").
69. Dale, supra note 7, at CRS-6 ("It could be countered that professional players have a
diminished expectation of privacy as the consequence of league or association rules that already
require routine physical examinations and testing for drugs in certain circumstances.").
70. Id.
71. See Floyd, supra note 47, at 343 ("The key consideration in determining the government's
interest has been whether the interest was "compelling."); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (stating that consent is a well-established exception to conducting a search
without a warrant).
72. See Masteralexis, supra note 4, at 779 (stating that when policies are established through
collective bargaining, the parties are able to negotiate the deal and essentially give their consent to
the adopted policy).
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B. Drug Testing in Professional Sports
In the context of professional sports, drug testing has become a heated
issue with recent suspicions regarding the use of performance-enhancing
drugs among professional athletes.7  Historically, the leagues have
implemented drug testing policies through the leagues' respective collective
bargaining agreement.74 There is a growing and continuing importance of
performance-enhancing drug testing policies in professional sports in order
to secure the integrity of the sport and to assure that players are the product
of natural talent and training. This is evidenced by the ongoing discussions
and ever-increasing drug testing policies being implemented by different
professional leagues.75
1. Recent Agreements Strengthening Performance-enhancing Drug
Testing
The National Football League (NFL) and the National Football League
Players Association reached a new agreement regarding testing for steroids
and other performance-enhancing drugs in January of 2007.76 The new
policy will see forty-percent more players randomly tested each week during
the pre-season, regular season and post-season.7 7  The NFL also tests its
players in the off-season, with each player subject to a maximum of six
random tests. 78 With its new policy the NFL will become the first North
American professional sports league to test for the drug erythropoietin
(EPO). 79 The deal added a new feature to the league's collective bargaining
agreement which provides for an automatic forfeiture of a prorated portion
73. See Dale, supra note 7, at CRS-I (noting that there are currently four bills regarding drug
testing for professional athletes in Congress); see Brady, et al. supra note 6.
74. See Masteralexis, supra note 4, at 780-786 (noting that the NFL, NBA, NHL and MLB all
have performance-enhancing drug testing policies implemented through the leagues' respective
collective bargaining agreements).
75. See Dave Goldberg, NFL and Players Union Reach Agreement on Tougher Drug Testing,
THE BAYLOR LARIAT, Jan. 24, 2007, at 4, available at http://www.baylor.edu/content/
services/document.php?id-40353; Shipley, supra note 6, at DOI; see also Brady et al., supra note 6.
76. See National Football League Players Association, NFL, NFLPA Reach Agreement on
Additional Improvements to Steroids Program, http://www.nflpa.com/newsandevents/Steroids-
Improvement-Agnimt.aspx (last visited Nov. 23, 2007) [hereinafter NFL Additions to Steroids
Program].
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Goldberg, supra note 75, at 4 (stating that EPO provides users more stamina by increasing
their number of red blood cells, and the drug is primarily used by endurance sport athletes, such as
long distance runners and cyclists).
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of a player's signing bonus if suspended for a steroid or other substance
abuse violation.80
2. Benefits of Drug Testing Implemented Through Legislation
With recent proposed federal legislation calling for mandated drug
testing, individual constitutional rights are of primary concern. 81  An
argument in support of federally-mandated drug testing is that it provides a
sure way to see that the players are being properly tested, and minimizes the
concern that a particular league has a weak stance on drug testing. If a
particular league and its players never agree to a sufficient drug testing
policy, then collective bargaining is not getting the job done.
Furthermore, by passing legislation that establishes only minimum drug
testing requirements, the collective bargaining process will still ultimately
decide the specific terms of the policy in place. Legislation that only
provides a guaranteed minimum threshold without disturbing the collective
bargaining process appears to be a valid alternative.
Although implementing drug testing policies through legislation has its
benefits, an ongoing policy negotiated through collective bargaining is more
efficient in the long run. As discussed below, collective bargaining has a
built-in check and balance system, as defined by public policy, which could
render a league's drug testing policy unenforceable if it fails to meet a
minimum standard.82
IV. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
Collective bargaining is the process of negotiation that occurs between
representatives of a labor union and the employer or some representative of
management. The resulting agreement is a contract containing the terms
80. NFL Additions to Steroids Program, supra note 76.
81. Dale, supra note 7, at CRS-1 (stating that there are four professional athletic drug testing
bills before Congress).
82. See E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 531 U.S. 57, 62 (2000)
(stating that a collective bargaining agreement that is contrary to public policy may be held
unenforceable).
83. See id. at 60 (regarding dispute over the terms of a collective bargaining agreement
between Eastern Associated Coal Corp. and the United Mine Workers of America labor union.);
Holmes v. NFL, 939 F. Supp. 517, 520 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (regarding dispute over the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement agreed to between the National Football League Players
Association, on behalf of the players, and the National Football League Management Council, on
159
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and conditions of employment; including wages, hours worked, benefits,
working conditions, and grievance procedures. 
84
A. Collective Bargaining Agreements in Professional Sports
Collective bargaining agreements are commonly used by professional
sports leagues in America. All the major professional sports leagues 86
have implemented collective bargaining agreements to determine the
conditions of employment for the players.87  Collective bargaining
agreements in professional sports commonly involve issues such as players'
salaries, a reserve system (or free agency), and grievance procedures.88 In
the twenty-first century, a league's policy on testing for performance-
enhancing drugs has become a key topic in collective bargaining
negotiation.89 The perceived failures of drug testing policies implemented
through collective bargaining has prompted proposal of federal legislation
and threatens to take the issue out of the control of the collective bargaining
process. 9°
B. Arbitration's Role in Collective Bargaining Agreements
When an issue arises regarding some term or condition of a collective
bargaining agreement, often the contract will specify the grievance
behalf of all NFL clubs.); see, e.g., Major League Baseballs Player's Association, 2003-2006 Basic
Agreement [hereinafter MLBPA Basic Agreement], available at
http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba-english.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2007).
84. See, e.g., MLBPA Basic Agreement, supra note 83; NBPA Collective Bargaining
Agreement, supra note 3; National Football League Players Association & National Football League
Management Council, Collective Bargaining Agreement Amended 2006 [hereinafter Collective
Bargaining Agreement Amended 2006],
http://www.nflpa.org/pdfs/Agents/CBAAmended_2006.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2007).
85. See id; NBPA Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 3; Collective Bargaining
Agreement Amended 2006, supra note 84.
86. This includes MLB, the NFL, the NBA, and the NHL.
87. See MLBPA Basic Agreement, supra note 83; NBPA Collective Bargaining Agreement,
supra note 3; Collective Bargaining Agreement Amended 2006, supra note 84.
88. See id.
89. See Masteralexis, supra note 4, at 776 (stating that each of the four major professional
sports leagues now has a drug testing policy implemented through collective bargaining).
90. See Dale, supra note 7, at CRS-I (using performance-enhancing drugs in professional
athletics has been the focus of a series of investigative hearings before the House Government
Reform Committee.); see also Shipley, supra note 6, at DOI; Brady, et al., supra note 6.
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procedures to be used in resolving the dispute. 91 Commonly, the collective
bargaining agreements will specify that grievances are submitted to an
arbitrator to make a fair determination of the parties' rights under the
contract. 92 Arbitration involves a neutral third-party, known as the
arbitrator, who interprets the agreement and determines the proper
resolution. 93  This process provides an alternative to the often slow, and
higher cost, option of using the court system to resolve a dispute.94
However, the courts may still become involved when a party challenges the
decision of an arbitrator.
95
1. Standard of Review for an Arbitration Decision
In some cases, one of the parties subject to an arbitration decision may
feel the arbitration award was unjust and an appeal to the court may be
necessary. However, where a collective bargaining agreement provides for a
matter to be submitted to arbitration, the courts are hesitant to overturn an
arbitrator's decision.
96
91. See Masteralexis, supra note 4, at 780 ("[Tlhe drug testing policies [in all of the major
professional sports leagues] are also linked to league disciplinary and grievance arbitration
provisions in their collective bargaining agreements.").
92. See, e.g., MLBPA Basic Agreement, supra note 83 (Article XI of the contract specifies the
grievance procedures to be used); NBPA Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 3 (Article
XXXI of the contract provides that any dispute under the contract will be resolved under the
authority of the grievance arbitrator); Collective Bargaining Agreement Amended 2006, supra note
84 (Articles IX and X specify the procedures to be used in the case of non-injury and injury
grievances, respectively.).
93. See Seth H. Lieberman, Something's Rotten in the State of Party-Appointed Arbitration:
Healing ADR's Black Eye that is "Nonneutral Neutrals" 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 215, 218
(Spring 2004) (defining an arbitrator "as a neutral person who resolves disputes between
parties...").
94. Henry C. Strickland, Allied-Bruce Terminix, Inc. v. Dobson: Widespread Enforcement of
Arbitration Agreements Arrives in Alabama, 56 ALA. LAW. 238, 241 (July 1995) (stating that
arbitration is usually "faster and less expensive than a judicial trial").
95. See, e.g., E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 531 U.S. 57, 61
(2000) ("Eastern brought suit in federal court seeking to have an arbitrator's award vacated,");
United Mine Workers of Am. Local Union 1323 v. Peabody Coal Co., No. 84-3880, 1985 WL
13816, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 29, 1985) (United Mine Workers union filed a complaint seeking to
vacate an arbitration award arguing that the arbitrator failed to follow the decisions of the Arbitration
Review Board, to which the Union and Peabody were parties.).
96. See Way Bakery v. Truck Drivers Local No. 164, 363 F.3d 590, 593 (6th Cir. 2004) ("A
court's review of an arbitration award 'is one of the narrowest standards of judicial review in all of
American jurisprudence."' (quoting Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Tenn. Valley Trades & Labor Council, 184
F.3d 510, 515 (6th Cir. 1999))).
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In Way Bakery v. Truck Drivers Local No. 164, 97 the Sixth Circuit
clearly defined the court's very limited role in reviewing an arbitrator's
award. In determining whether an arbitration award "draws its essence"
from the collective bargaining agreement, which is the main concern of a
reviewing court, the court is essentially making sure the arbitrator's award is
consistent, within with the express terms of the collective bargaining
agreement, and not "based on general considerations of fairness and equity"
which depart from the express terms of the agreement.
98
The limited role of the judiciary, in the context of arbitration resulting
from a collective bargaining agreement, was established by the Supreme
Court prior to Way Bakery.99 As long as the arbitrator is a neutral third party
and makes his decision based on the conditions of the contract, a reviewing
court is unlikely to reverse a decision even if it disagrees with the
outcome. 100 The Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he refusal of courts to
review the merits of an arbitration award is the proper approach to
arbitration under collective bargaining agreements."' 0 ' The difficulty in
ignoring the merits while reviewing an arbitration decision has led district
courts to improperly vacate arbitration awards, only to have them reinstated
by the reviewing court of appeal. '02
The Sixth Circuit in United Mine Workers of America v. Peabody Coal
Co.,1 0 3 reversed a district court decision to vacate an arbitrator's award.'4
In reversing, and reinstating the award, the Sixth Circuit stated that "it is the
decision of the arbitrator, and not of this court, for which the parties have
97. Id. at 590.
98. Id. at 593 ("An award fails where: (1) it conflicts with the express terms of the agreement;
(2) it imposes additional requirements not expressly provided for in the agreement; (3) it is not
rationally supported by or derived from the agreement; or (4) it is based on general considerations of
fairness and equity instead of the express terms of the agreement.").
99. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82
(1960) (noting that the considerations used by a labor arbitrator are a product of the unique functions
he performs, and may well be foreign to the competence of the courts).
100. See E. Associated Coal Corp., 531 U.S. at 62 ("[A]s long as [an honest] arbitrator is even
arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, [the fact
that] a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision."
(quoting Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987))).
101. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960).
102. See id.
103. See United Mine Workers of Am., Local Union 1323 v. Peabody Coal Co., 1985 WL
13816 (6th Cir. Oct. 29, 1985).
104. Id. at *3 (stating that "neither the irrationality nor manifest infidelity to the collective
bargaining agreement" which is required to support vacation of the arbitrator's award was present in
the case).
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bargained."''  Despite the narrow standard of review, there are
circumstances that can render a collective bargaining agreement
unenforceable, taking the decision away from an arbitrator.
2. Public Policy Exception to Arbitration Review
The Court has identified a legal exception that makes a collective
bargaining agreement which is contrary to public policy unenforceable.
10 6
In a 2000 decision, Eastern Associated Coal Corporation v. United Mine
Workers of America, the Court upheld an arbitrator's decision to reinstate a
mine worker, who was a member of the appellee union, after the worker had
failed two random drug tests and was fired by the appellant. 0 7  The
collective bargaining agreement at issue specified that in order to discharge
an employee, Eastern Associated Coal Corporation, the appellant, needed to
prove it had "just cause."' 1 8 Based on the specific circumstances in that
case, the arbitrator determined that Eastern had not proven "just cause" for
the discharge of the employee and he was reinstated. 10 9 On appeal, Eastern
argued that the arbitrator's award should be overturned because the
reinstatement of the employee violated public policy. 01 The Court reasoned
that it was not a question of whether the employee's drug use violated
public policy, but whether the collective bargaining agreement itself
constituted a violation of public policy. "'
In determining if a collective bargaining agreement runs afoul of public
policy, and can thereby be considered unenforceable, the ultimate question is
whether the specified conditions of the collective bargaining agreement "run
contrary to an explicit, well-defined, and dominant public policy, as
ascertained by reference to positive law and not from general considerations
of supposed public interests." 12 The Court in Eastern Coal recognized that
105. Id. at *3 ("[A]n arbitrator's decision is entitled to great deference and generally should be
upheld absent irrationality or disregard of plain and unambiguous language in the agreement.").
106. E. Associated Coal Corp., 531 U.S. at 62.
107. Id. at 59-60.
108. Id. at 60.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 61 ("Eastern brought suit in federal court seeking to have the arbitrator's award
vacated, arguing that the award contravened a public policy against the operation of dangerous
machinery by workers who tested positive for drugs.").
111. 1d. at 62-63.
112. Id. at 63. (citing United Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 43
(1987)).
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"reasonable people can differ" in determining whether termination or
suspension was the proper punishment for the failed drug test, but ultimately
did not see any contravention of public policy as defined by W R. Grace &
Co. v. Local Union 759,113 and upheld the award. 114 The Court is highly
deferential to both the arbitrator's decision and the collective bargaining
agreement, which calls for arbitration as a grievance resolution process.
A collective bargaining agreement established between a players union
and a professional sports league which does not test its players for
performance-enhancing drugs may be unenforceable on public policy
grounds. There is a strong public policy interest in knowing the
performance of professional athletes is a product of natural talent and
training." 5  If the public perceives the athletes of a particular sport as
unnatural or the product of performance-enhancing drugs, the image of the
league and of the sport would suffer." 6  Additionally, the illegality of
steroids and performance-enhancing drugs furthers the argument, and
references a "positive law." 117  Therefore, one could argue that a
professional sports league's collective bargaining agreement that does not
call for sufficient testing for performance-enhancing drugs would be
contrary to an "explicit, well-defined, and dominant" public policy and
would be legally unenforceable. "8
If the public policy supporting testing professional athletes for
performance-enhancing drugs is strong enough, the parties to collective
bargaining in professional sports must agree on a sufficient testing plan;
otherwise, the collective bargaining agreement itself could be
unenforceable. "9 The public policy exception is a check on the nature of
collective bargaining agreements. This mechanism serves the same function
as federal legislation which would require minimum drug testing
requirements. Thus, the currently proposed federal legislation is an
113. See W. R. Grace & Co. v. Rubberworkers Local Union 759,461 U.S. 757 (1983).
114. E. Associated Coal Corp., 531 U.S. at 67.
115. See Dale, supra note 7, at CRS-I (stating that steroid use among professional athletes has
"been the focus of a series of investigative hearings before the House Government Reform
Committee").
116. See Shipley, supra note 6, at DO I(stating that Major League Baseball players are fed up
with the steroid speculation surrounding their sport and the inflated numbers being attributed to
steroid use).
117. National Institute on Drug Abuse: Research Report Series, Anabolic Steroid Abuse,
http://www.drugabuse.gov/PDF/RRSteroids.pdf 6 (last visited Nov. 23, 2007) (acknowledging that
professional athletes arc suspected of abusing illegal anabolic steroids).
118. See E. Associated Coal Corp., 531 U.S. at 62 (stating that a collective bargaining
agreement which is contrary to public policy can be deemed unenforceable).
119. See id. at 63 (stating that a contract agreement which is contrary to public policy can be
held unenforceable).
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overreaction and unnecessary. Furthermore, establishing minimum
requirements through public policy, rather than legislation, provides a more
flexible system which will adapt to societal changes.
C. Drug Testing Policies under Collective Bargaining Agreements
Collective bargaining negotiations provide the proper forum for
establishing drug testing policies in professional sports for two main
reasons.1"0  First, it allows the parties to negotiate their own rights.' 21
Second, it eliminates certain constitutional issues that may arise if the policy
is implemented through other means. 122
Unlike the proposed legislation, drug testing policies established
through collective bargaining allow the parties that are going to be affected
to have a hand in creating the policy. 23  Professional team sport athletes, as
unionized employees, are subject to labor laws which "require union and
management to bargain in good faith over mandatory subjects."' 124  The
National Labor Relations Board, the federal authority regarding collective
bargaining, "has held that drug and alcohol testing of employees is a
mandatory subject of bargaining."'21 5 Despite federal labor policy, there are
currently numerous congressional bills relating to testing for performance-
120. See Masteralexis , supra note 4, at 778 (stating that collective bargaining negotiations
create an ideal forum for a number of reasons, including: parties' opportunity to review their rights
before negotiating, parties' knowledge about the customary policies within a particular industry, and
parties' knowledge of what the particular needs of the industry require).
121. See Masteralexis, supra note 4, at 779.
122. See Andrew M. Souder, Bargaining Away Fourth Amendment Rights in Labor Dispute
Resolution: Bolden v. SEPTA (1991), 38 VILL. L. REV. 1133, 1138 (1993) (stating that an individual
can waive his or her Fourth Amendment protections from unreasonable searches by consenting to
the search).
123. Masteralexis, supra note 4, at 776.
While Congressional hearings may in fact spur changes in professional leagues' drug
testing policies, Congress should not substitute its judgment for the bargaining process
which can take into account the business environment, past practice, culture, history, and
relationships between the parties involved. The bargaining environment is one that will
likely lead to a more effective drug policy because both sides will have ownership in it.
Id.
124. Id. (stating that mandatory subjects are those that are plainly germane to the working
environment).
125. Id. (citing Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. 180, 182-84 (1989)).
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enhancing drugs in professional sports. 12 6 If passed, this legislation would
take the issue of establishing drug testing policies in professional sports
away from collective bargaining.
Additionally, when constitutional issues are considered, the collective
bargaining process is clearly a superior means of implementing drug testing.
If the government passed legislation establishing drug testing policies, the
resulting regulations would be subject to strict constitutional scrutiny
regarding Fourth Amendment and due process concerns.127 Constitutional
concerns would be far less where a drug testing policy is established through
collective bargaining in which the players consent to be tested as negotiated
between the union representatives and owners. By implementing a drug
testing plan through the collective bargaining process, Fourth Amendment
concerns regarding unreasonable search and seizure would no longer be an
issue because the players would have be consented to the search. 2 '
Specifically, a union that negotiates a drug testing policy for its members is
consents on behalf of all its members who are subject to the drug testing
policy. Some circuits have already suggested that the union's consent
through collective bargaining may eliminate potential Fourth Amendment
concerns for unreasonable search. 129
In sum, although legislation may provide short-term relief, a policy
negotiated through collective bargaining would be the most fair to the parties
involved and be far less likely to raise constitutional concerns. "0
V. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROVIDES THE PROPER FORUM
FOR ESTABLISHING DRUG TESTING POLICIES
It is not a matter of if, but a matter of how performance-enhancing drug
testing policies should be implemented in professional sports leagues. As
mentioned previously, the advantages of collective bargaining outweigh the
use of legislation to enforce the testing for performance-enhancing drugs
which the public demands and the integrity of the sports require.
126. Masteralexis, supra note 4, at 776 (stating that federal labor policy dictates that disputes
between employers and employees regarding mandatory subjects be handled in the private sector
rather than through government intervention).
127. See Floyd, supra note 47, at 341.
128. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) ("[O]ne of the specifically
established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is
conducted pursuant to consent." (citing Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946))).
129. Souder, supra note 123, at 1140.
130. See Masteralexis, supra note 4, at 778 (stating that collective bargaining is likely to
develop a fairer system because the parties involved will have the opportunity to consider their rights
prior to negotiating a plan).
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A. Handling of Individual Grievances
The intrusiveness of drug testing raises concerns over the privacy rights
of the individuals being tested, and therefore challenges to failed tests, or to
the process itself, are likely to occur. The collective bargaining agreements
provide for grievance procedures which establish a more efficient process
than the process of challenging federally mandated drug testing. 3 '
Grievances with the drug testing policies would be handled as directed in the
collective bargaining agreement and would be subject to arbitration.' 32  An
arbitrator would interpret the drug testing policy in the contract and resolve
any issues accordingly. 33  In the case of federally mandated drug testing,
individuals who were negatively impacted by the testing would be likely to
raise constitutional arguments over the invasion of privacy, and the federal
court system would be the forum for handling grievances. 34 The arbitration
process would be able to handle the cases more quickly and less
expensively. '35
B. Consent to Drug Testing Alleviates Concerns
Not only does arbitration through collective bargaining provide a more
efficient and cost effective means of resolving these issues, but the people
being tested would be less likely to attack drug testing policies implemented
through collective bargaining. 136 A federally mandated drug testing program
is governmental action which is subject to constitutional due process
131. Strickland, supra note 94, at 241 (stating that arbitration is usually faster and less
expensive than a judicial trial).
132. See Masteralexis, supra note 4, at 780 (stating that drug testing policies in all of the four
major professional sports leagues are linked to league disciplinary and arbitration provisions within
the collective bargaining agreement).
133. See E. Associated Coal Corp., 531 U.S. at 61 (stating that under a collective bargaining
agreement that provides for arbitration, "both employer and union grant to the arbitrator the
authority to interpret the meaning of their contract's language...).
134. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."). Id.
135. Strickland, supra note 94, at 241 (stating that arbitration is usually faster and less
expensive than a judicial trial).
136. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219 (stating that consent is one of the specifically established
exceptions to the requirement for a search warrant); see also Masteralexis, supra note 4, at 776
(noting that through collective bargaining agreements, players are essentially giving their consent to
the performance enhancing drug testing policies adopted in the agreement).
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concerns, as well as constitutional concerns over individual privacy.137
Conversely, player representatives are private actors who negotiate a
collective bargaining agreement that implements a drug testing policy that
the players consent to, through the representatives.1 38  Because of the
consent, constitutional concerns over due process and privacy would no
longer be an issue. 139 The players would be making a contractual agreement
to submit to the testing and any challenge would be decided by the terms of
the agreement. 140
C. Collective Bargaining Provides A Fair Solution
In addition to being a more efficient policy, the negotiation aspect of a
collective bargaining agreement assures a fair policy, or at least one that the
players have agreed to.' 41  Despite the strong public desire to see
comprehensive drug testing and the assurance of natural athletes, the players
are still individuals and entitled to privacy rights.'42  A policy negotiated
through collective bargaining allows the players to establish an acceptable
policy which still accomplishes the purpose of guaranteeing the integrity of
the athletes who compete. 143
VI. CONCLUSION
Collective bargaining agreements provide a superior forum for
implementing performance-enhancing drug testing policies over federal
legislation. Professional team sport athletes in America are unionized
employees, and national labor policy instructs that drug and alcohol testing
is a mandatory subject for bargaining.'44 Drug testing policies implemented
through collective bargaining allow player representatives to be involved in
137. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law...").
138. See Masteralexis, supra note 4, at 776 (stating that players would be consenting to drug
testing policies established through collective bargaining).
139. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228 (stating that a search conducted pursuant to consent is
constitutionally permissible).
140. See E. Associated Coal Corp., 531 U.S. at 61 (stating that the parties to a collective
bargaining agreement grant the arbitrator authority to interpret the contract's meaning).
141. See Masteralexis, supra note 4, at 779 (stating that collective bargaining allows the players
to review their rights before negotiating and agreeing to a policy).
142. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
143. See Masteralexis, supra note 4, at 779 ("A collective bargaining agreement can be
renewed, reviewed, and renegotiated when the parties find that conditions have evolved in such a
way as to require the two sides to come back to the bargaining table to re-open the agreement.").
144. Masteralexis, supra note 4, at 775.
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the negotiation and approval of the policies. The players are consenting and
agreeing to the implemented policies. Due to the intrusive nature of drug
testing, federally mandated policies are likely to be challenged on
constitutional grounds, increasing the strain on the court system. Although
federal legislation provides a "quick fix" to the problem of athletes using
performance-enhancing drugs, allowing the policies to be negotiated and
agreed upon through collective bargaining will be more efficient, fair, and
more adaptable to changes in technology and public concern. Furthermore,
collective bargaining agreements are subject to public policy, and therefore,
they must sufficiently address performance-enhancing drug use among
athletes or risk being held unenforceable. The public policy exception to
collective bargaining agreements achieves the same purpose that federally
mandated minimum drug testing standards propose to address without the
added stress on the court system.
23
Washutka: Collective Bargaining Agreements in Professional Sports: The Prop
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2007
24
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol8/iss1/5
